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Recent Developments

Johnson v. State:
Upon the Defendant's Request, the State Must Furnish a Defendant's Recorded
Statement, Even if the State Only Intends to Use the Content of the Recording at
Trial
ByTammyR. Johnson

he Court of Appeals of
Maryland held that pursuant
to Maryland Rule 4-263, upon a
defendant's request, the State must
furnish a defendant with his prior
recorded statement made to a State
agent and may not introduce the
substance of that statement through
the testimony of a State agent at trial.
Johnson v. State, 360 Md. 250, 757
A.2d 796 (2000). The court found
that recorded statements made to a
State agent should be made available
to a defendant so that he might
effectively prepare his case for trial.
On August 2, 1996, police
interrogated Larry Marcus Johnson
("Johnson") for his suspected
involvement in several household
burglaries. Johnson was interrogated
again on August 14, 1996, and this
interrogation was apparently
videotaped. After the interrogation,
the police obtained a warrant to
search Johnson's home and
workplace, which resulted in the
seizure of hundreds of stolen items.
Johnson was ultimately charged with
first-degree burglary and fourteen
counts of theft over $300.
In a pre-trial hearing, Johnson
requested a copy of the State's
recording of his statement,
reasoning that the recording was
vital for possible suppression
purposes, and to prepare cross-
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examination of the interrogating
officer. The Circuit Court of Anne
Arundel County, however, held that
discovery rules required only that the
defense receive the substance of any
oral statements, and allowed the
substance ofJohnson's statements to
be introduced via the testimony ofthe
interrogating officer. The trial judge
then found Johnson guilty of the
charges. The court of special appeals
affirmed, reasoning that the trial court
did not err because the substance of
the content of Johnson's recorded
statement had been provided through
the testimony of the interrogating
officer.
The primary issue on appeal was
whether, pursuant to Rule 4263(b)(2), the State was required to
provide to the defense a recorded
statement where, instead of
introducing the recording at trial, it
presented the substance of the
statement through the testimony ofthe
interrogating officer. Johnson, at 253,
757 A.2d at 798. The court began
its analysis by considering the
discovery requirements of Rule 4263. !d. at 264, 757 A.2d at 803.
Upon the defendant's request, the
State's attorney shall:
. . . [a]s to all statements
made by the defendant to a
State agent that the State
intends to use at a hearing or

trial, furnish to the defendant,
... (A) a copy ofeach written
or recorded statement, and
(B) the substance of each
oral statement and a copy of
all reports of each
statement. ..
Id. at 264, 757 A.2d at 804
(quoting Md. Rule 4-263(b)(2)).
The court reasoned that the
scope of pretrial disclosure required
by Rule 4-263 is a product of its dual
purposes. !d. at 265, 757 A.2d at
804. First, in terms of fundamental
fairness, broad discovery rules aid
defendants in preparing their defenses
and protect them from surprise at trial.
!d. Second, Rule 4-263 is designed
''to force the defendant to file certain
motions before trial, including a
motion to suppress any unlawfully
obtained statement." !d. (quoting
White v. State, 300 Md. 719, 734,
481 A.2d 201, 208 (1984)).
Moreover, "[t]he defendant cannot
be expected to file such motions prior
to trial unless he can obtain the
necessary information to prepare for
the suppression or exclusion hearing."
!d. (quoting Warrick v. State, 302
Md. 162,169, 486 A.2d 189, 193
(1985)) .
In analyzing Rule 4-263, the
court considered the plain text ofthe
rule. Id. at 265, 757 A.2d at 804.
Under a plain meaning analysis, the
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court had no doubt that Johnson's
counsel made pretrial requests to
receive a copy ofhis client's recorded
statement. !d. at 266, 757 A.2d at
805. Despite his requests, however,
the statement was not forthcoming. !d.
Instead, the State introduced the
substance of Johnson's statement
through the interrogating officer,
rationalizing its position by arguing that
it did not intend to use or play the
actual recording itselfat trial. !d. The
court held, however, that the intended
use by the State of the prior recorded
statement was not merely the intended
use ofthe actual recording at trial, but
also included an intent to use a
derivative version of the defendant's
statement during the State's case-inchief. !d. at 267, 757 A.2d at 805.
The court reasoned that the State was
not allowed to circumvent the pretrial
disclosure requirement ofRule 4-263
by using a derivative version of
Johnson's statement through the
interrogating officer. !d.
Moreover, the court held, upon
the defendant's request, the State
must furnish a defendant's
apparently available recorded
statement made to a State agent. !d.
This is true even if the State intends
only to use the content of the
recorded statement at trial and does
not intend to use the physical recording
itself. !d. The court reasoned that to
hold otherwise would render Rule 4263(b)(2)(A) "a nullity." !d.
The court had previously issued
a word of caution regarding the
potential consequences of failing to
disclose a defendant's statement. !d.
at 268-69, 757 A.2d at 806. If a
statement was discoverable, yet not
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provided, the trial court may within
its discretion, impose a sanction under
Rule 4-263(i). Id at 269, 757 A.2d
at 806. These sanctions include
discovery of the previously
undisclosed item, striking the
testimony related to the undisclosed
matter, granting a continuance,
prohibiting the introduction of
evidence related to the matter not
disclosed, granting a mistrial, or
entering any other appropriate order.
!d. This warning is even more
applicable when a recorded statement
is given to a State agent and appears
to be available. !d.
Disclosure requirements, the
court reasoned, are designed to
prevent the State from having
largely unchecked discretion to
summarize, edit, or characterize the
content of a defendant's recorded
statement in any form it chooses. Id
at 268, 757 A.2d at 806. When a
recorded statement is available, an
oral delivery by a State's witness
may not substitute or describe the
nuances, qualities, or manner in
which the interrogation was
conducted. !d. Mere production
of the substance of a defendant's
prior recorded statement risks
thwarting defense counsel's ability
to determine the lawfulness of the
interrogation or the evidence
stemming from it. !d.
In light ofthe court's holding that
a derivative version of Johnson's
statement was not a substitute for the
apparently available recorded
statement, the court next addressed
whether the non-disclosure of the
recording by the State was harmless
error. !d. at 269, 757 A.2d at 806.

An error is not harmless, and a
reversal is mandated when the
reviewing court, upon its own
independent review of the record, is
able to declare beyond a reasonable
doubt that the error in no way
influenced the verdict. !d. The court
then held that the error was not
harmless and Johnson was
prejudiced, reasoning that
"[c]ommon sense and judicial
experience teach that a defendant's
prior statement in the possession of
the government may be the single
most crucial factor in the defendant's
preparation for trial." !d. at 26970, 757 A.2d at 806-07 (citing
United States v. Percevault, 490
F.2d 126, 129-30 (2d Cir. 1974)).
The court also reasoned that,
"[ e]very experienced trial judge and
trial lawyer knows the value for
impeaching purposes of statements
of the witness recording the events
before time dulls treacherous
memory." !d. at 270, 757 A.2d at
807 (citing Carr v. State, 284 Md.
455, 460-61, 397 A.2d 606, 60809 (1979)). Therefore, the judgment
of the court of special appeals was
reversed, and the case was
remanded to that court with
directions to reverse the trial
court's decision and to remand the
case to that court for a new trial.
!d. at271-72, 757 A.2d808.
The Johnson decision stands for
the proposition that where a defendant
has made an apparently available
recorded statement, the in court
testimony of the interrogating officer
is no substitute for the recording. The
court's decision makes clear that
prosecutors will not be allowed to
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encapsulate a defendant's recorded
statement through the testimony of a
State's witness. By so holding, the
court has persevered a defendant's
right to obtain discoverable State
evidence. Thus, the court sends the
message that where discovery
requirements are clear from their
plain meaning, the requirements of
the rules will not be diminished by
State wishes.
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